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Abstract
We investigate whether the news presentation format
affects the believability of a news story and the engage-
ment level of social media users. Specifically, we test
to see if highlighting the source delivering the story can
nudge the users to think more critically about the truth-
fulness of the story that they see, and for obscure sources,
whether source ratings can affect how the users evaluate
the truthfulness. We also test whether the believability
can influence the users’ engagement level for the pre-
sented news post (e.g., read, like, comment, and share).
We find that such changes in the news presentation for-
mat indeed have significant impacts on how social media
users perceive and act on news items.
Keywords: Fake news, social media, story format,
source highlighting, source rating.
1. Introduction
“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog” [34].
The famous New Yorker cartoon suggests that on
the Internet, you are anonymous, and the unspoken
corollary is that deception in the cyberworld is easy
because you can pretend to be whatever you want—
a dog or not. Deception has been a long-running
problem, and it rose to global attention in 2016 with
the US presidential election, where deception in the
form of “fake news” was deliberately created as part
of a disinformation campaign to influence the elec-
tion results [1, 3]. The prevalence of fake news has
not only shaken the public’s trust in journalism as
a whole but also stirred up criticism towards social
media service providers, such as Facebook, for not
taking more proactive countermeasures [3].
News has always been questionable in its reliabil-
ity; even before the rise of the Internet, some news-
papers were known for their biases and potentially
distorted news [9]. Today, almost 62% of adults get
news from social media (primarily Facebook), and
the proportion is increasing [10]. The difference with
Facebook is that anyone can create “news”—real or
fake—and share it, and the news spreads throughout
the Internet as social media users read and share it
with their contacts. The quality control function has
been moved from trained journalists with a puta-
tive interest in truth, to regular Internet users who
have no training and often give little thought to ver-
ifying sources before spreading news. About 23% of
social media users report that they have spread fake
news—16% by accident and 14% intentionally [3].1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether
changes to the way in which the source of “news” is
presented in social media—or the Web as a whole—
can “nudge” [39] social media users to make more
mindful decisions about whether to believe stories
and associated activities (e.g., read, like, comment,
and share) which contribute to the spread of news
stories. We investigate two approaches, one subtle
and simple (changing the interface to highlight the
source telling the story) and another that is more
expensive (a source rating—not to be confused with
story rating). Our results show that both have signif-
icant effects, with the subtle approach having more
than one third the impact of the more expensive
approach. We begin by summarizing past research
leading to hypotheses, followed by the methods,
results, and a discussion of the findings and their
implications.
2. Prior Theory and Research
2.1. Fake News on the Internet
Fake news has been defined as “news articles that
are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mis-
lead readers” [1, p. 213]. Fake news has long been
a problem, but many observers have noted that it
1 The percentages add to more than 23% because some people
have done both.
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became increasingly important during the 2016 elec-
tion in the United States [4], where it may have actu-
ally influenced the outcome [1, 3]. Fake news can be
created for profit (e.g., click-bait advertising) or to
spread propaganda and disinformation [35, 37].
In response to fake news, a number of fact check-
ing initiatives have been launched [11]. There are
many similarities and some important differences
among the different initiatives [11, 22], and fact
checking has been shown to influence the perceived
credibility of a person or a story [41]. However,
one problem with fact checking is that it occurs
after the story is made public [32]. News articles
tend to have a short “shelf life,” and by the time
fact checking has taken place, the articles would
most likely have gone through their life cycle; fact
checking individual stories is simply too slow. Sev-
eral technical solutions attempt to automate fact
checking, such as Truthy [31] and Hoaxy [32], so
that results can be provided more quickly. Among
them, Hoaxy is probably the best known technical
solution. It searches fact checking sites that ver-
ify news stories (e.g., snopes.com, politifact.com,
and factcheck.org) and sites that have a history of
publishing fake news to build a database of stories.
It routinely monitors the spread of stories in real
time (e.g., by monitoring Twitter and RSS feeds)
and displays both the spread of stories, and their
fact checking.
In this paper, we present two alternatives to fact
checking, both of which provide information that
may influence the believability of stories in real time,
at the same time as the potentially fake (or true) sto-
ries are posted on social media. In the sections below,
we begin with information processing in social media
and the effects of confirmation bias. We then turn to
the two approaches that we propose: A change in the
presentation format, and source reliability ratings.
2.2. Information Processing in Social
Media
Most individuals use social media for hedonistic pur-
poses [13] such as seeking entertainment or connect-
ing with friends [17], rather than utilitarian ones
such as completing work tasks. Research suggests
that individuals in a hedonistic mindset may be less
likely to critically consider information than those
with a utilitarian mindset, as their consumption is
tied to what they desire the reality to be, rather than
what they know to be real [14].
Facebook tracks and learns users’ preferences in
stories by tracking what they read and the actions
that they take (e.g., like, comment, and share). As
a commercial entity, Facebook aims to maximize
user satisfaction, and thus, it deliberately displays
more stories matching the users’ choices, so that
the users see more stories that match their existing
beliefs [42]. Such a process causes a decrease in the
range of information that the users encounter, and,
as a result, Facebook users often exist in small infor-
mation bubbles—often referred to as echo cham-
bers [4]—that reinforce their beliefs and make them
believe that the world is more like them [42].
When individuals encounter information that
challenges their pre-existing beliefs, they experience
cognitive dissonance [8]. Suppose that an individ-
ual is presented with two contradictory facts both
of which are plausible (e.g., John is honest, but a
story says he lied). Since both cannot be true at the
same time, this individual must resolve the incon-
sistency, either by concluding that the two facts are
not contradictory (e.g., John lied, but he is still hon-
est because lying is not related to honesty), or by
accepting one and rejecting the other (e.g., John is
honest and thus I do not believe he lied; or John lied
and thus I do not believe he is honest) [8].
Resolving such a cognitive dissonance takes cog-
nitive effort, and humans tend to be cognitive mis-
ers who resist expending effort [33]. This tendency
is exacerbated when humans are in a hedonistic
mindset [14]. Because rejecting the new informa-
tion is cognitively simpler than reassessing one’s
pre-existing beliefs, most people retain their exist-
ing belief and discard the new information as being
false [5, 20, 25]. This tendency to favor information
that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs and ignore
information that challenges them is called confirma-
tion bias [5, 20, 30]. Thus, people are more likely to
believe information that matches their pre-existing
views (i.e., attitude homophily or alignment [1, 15]):
H1: Pre-existing beliefs directly influence the extent
to which a story is perceived to be believable.
2.3. News Story versus Story
In the physical world, people care a great deal about
the source of a news story that they hear [24]. When
someone tells us something new, we are naturally
attuned to the veracity of the speaker. We accept
new information from those we trust and believe
to be experts on the topic [16, 24], and discount
news from those we distrust or from those whom we
know have a history of being gullible and falling for
false stories. For example, suppose one of your col-
leagues told you that the accounting server had been
hacked and your firm had lost $2 million. Would you
Page 3956
believe it? Part of your perception would be driven
by pre-existing beliefs about computer security at
your firm (i.e., confirmation bias), and part would
be influenced by the person who told you the story
(e.g., whether he or she has expert knowledge and is
deemed trustworthy).
So why is the online world different? Why do we
pay less attention to the source of a news story on
social media than to the headline? In the online
world, stories are often presented as “news” (closely
akin to “fact”) without much emphasis on who is
telling the story. We focus on Facebook because it is
currently the most ubiquitous social media platform
in the world, with more than 1.8 billion users [3]. Fig-
ure 1 shows a news story posted on Facebook. The
design highlights the story headline and presents the
item as we might see an article on a news site such
as ABC News or The Wall Street Journal.
Figure 1. An example of Facebook news post
This subtle framing of a Facebook story as “news”
not as a “story” influences how we process it; we
adopt the mindset for processing “news,” not the
mindset for processing “stories.” News is expected
to be properly sourced and vetted to prevent inten-
tional bias or unintentional error [40, 44]. Stories
are content written by an original source that may
have been subjected to the journalistic standards of
news—or may not! If the original source is a recog-
nized news source (e.g., ABC News), then it is more
likely that the story has been subjected to journal-
istic standards than if it is written by an individual
acting on his or her own.
If we can nudge [39] social media users to perceive
content as stories, not news (i.e., so they are not
perceived as factual news but rather as stories told
by a specific person or organization), we may induce
a more skeptical mindset, the same skeptical mindset
that we instinctively use when we hear stories in the
physical world.
We propose that framing social media content as
stories, as opposed to news, can be achieved by two
subtle changes in interface design that together will
nudge [39] users to adopt a different mental model
when reading a news story on social media.
2.3.1. Source-primacy vs. content-primacy.
The first change is to highlight the source of the story
(i.e., the original author) rather than the headline.
In the physical world, who says something always
comes before the content. When we talk with people,
we see who they are before we process what they say.
Likewise on a phone call, we process who is talking
before we consider the content.
In this source-primacy world, we use our a priori
knowledge of the source when we are presented with
a story, and our knowledge of the source shapes how
we evaluate the content [16]. We are more likely to
believe information from sources we trust and are
less likely to accept information from sources we dis-
trust or simply do not know [24]. Thus, our a priori
knowledge of the source directly influences how we
process information.
Currently on Facebook, the original source of a
story is placed after the content in an inconspicuous
manner (see Figure 1). While a user could read the
article from the bottom up, in most countries, peo-
ple read from top to bottom. In this content-primacy
world of Facebook, we read the content first and
only consider the source as an afterthought, if at all.
This interface design influences us to process content
with no immediate consideration for the source. We
argue that this presentation format disrupts the nor-
mal consideration of source that occurs in a source-
primacy presentation and makes users more likely
to accept the content without the normal and auto-
matic consideration of the source that occurs in a
source-primacy world.2
2 Google also uses this content-primacy approach in present-
ing search results.
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Adapting the current content-primacy Facebook
interface design to be source-primacy is simple: place
the source before the content and highlight the
source in a way that will induce users to read it
before they read the content.
2.3.2. Story teller versus reporter. To help
frame the content as a story, not a news item, we
need to show the reader that the source is telling
the reader, not reporting facts in the manner of a
journalist. Figure 2(a) shows this framing. After the
source, the word “says” has been added to induce
users to consider the following post as what a story
teller says, not what a reporter reports. In other
words, the content is what the source has to say, not
a formal news story produced by a journalist, unless,
of course, the source is a formal news organization
known for its journalistic integrity.
2.3.3. Summary We argue these two interface
design changes (source-primary with a story teller)
will nudge users into a more skeptical mindset since
the story framing will nudge users to read the con-
tent as a “story” not as “news”. As a result, they will
adopt more skeptical information processing and will
be less likely to believe the story without expending
cognitive effort. In short, there will be a main effect:
H2: Content presented in the story format will be
perceived as less believable than content presented in
the news format.
As users exert more cognitive effort to assess the
truthfulness of the story, the effects of the source
will become more important. Just as in the physi-
cal world, stories from trusted sources will be more
likely to be evaluated as true than stories from
untrusted obscure sources. In other words, there will
be an interaction between whether the users trust
the source and the presentation format, such that
the presentation format will moderate the effects of
the users’ trust on the believability of story.
H3: Presentation format will moderate the relation-
ship between whether the users trust the source and
a story’s believability, such that the story format will
increase the strength of the impact from the users’
trust in the source on the story’s believability.
2.4. Source Ratings
One crucial limitation of fact checking each story
is that fact checking occurs long after the original
story has been posted. By the time the story has
been fact-checked, many users would have already
read the story and much of the damage from fake
news would have already been done. An important
alternative to fact checking all the stories is to rate
the original sources (e.g., authors or sites) on the
past stories the sources have produced and use those
historical ratings as a predictor of the credibility of
future stories. Such a source reliability measure can
easily leverage the idea of fact checkers.
Source reliability is the extent to which the source
is seen as producing valid statements, and it affects
the extent to which we believe a specific story to
be credible, although there are story-specific factors
as well [27, 43]. Source reliability in social media
is influenced by past performance and is gradu-
ally built by a history of behavior that displays
experience, expert knowledge, and reliable informa-
tion [38].
Source reliability often requires direct personal
experience with the source [38], but there are other
mechanisms that can be a substitute. For example,
platforms could collect ratings on each and every
item (i.e., story) from users and then create an over-
all rating for the source. Alternatively, users could
directly vote up or down the sources, and the votes
can be aggregated to represent the source rating.
Or, an expert panel could assess specific stories
(e.g., www.politifact.com) and subsequently rate
the sources. For our research, we treat the source rat-
ing system as a black box as the mechanism behind
the ratings is less important than how the ratings
are perceived by users. Here, we assume that the
ratings are created by aggregating the ratings of an
expert panel assessing prior stories produced by the
source. Past research shows that fact checking indi-
vidual stories or points influences perceived believ-
ability [41], so we argue that the aggregation of these
individual items will also have a similar effect:
H4: Source reliability ratings will directly affect the
believability of stories.
2.5. Effects on Behavior
Thus far, we have focused on the how social media
users assess the believability of news posts they see.
This believability, in turn, can affect the actions of
the users. They can choose to read the story or
not, and they can also choose to provide feedback
on the story (e.g., like or comment) as well as con-
tribute to the spread of story (e.g., share). Each
of these actions is separate and distinct; you can
like, comment on, or share a story without reading
it, although most people exhibit some coherence in
their behavior—reading before liking, sharing only if
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one read and liked a story (sometimes without click-
ing the Like button), and so on [18].
We argue that behavior is influenced by pre-
existing beliefs and the believability of the story. A
user is more likely to read a story if the story is
congruent with his or her prior beliefs due to con-
firmation bias [2]. Confirmation bias often causes
selective information search [2, 19], in which people
actively seek information that confirms their beliefs
and avoid information that does not. Selective infor-
mation search will be intensified when people are in
a hedonistic mindset because they are not seeking to
find a correct utilitarian outcome (e.g., determining
whether a view is correct), but rather are seeking
entertainment and enjoyment. Viewing information
that supports your beliefs is more enjoyable than
viewing information that challenges them [8, 26], so
people will be more likely to read stories that sup-
port their pre-existing beliefs.
Other types of actions available on Facebook—
such as like, comment, and share—are unequally dis-
tributed [12, 21]. Most users seldom engage in these
behaviors, perhaps because they require move cog-
nitive effort than simply reading [18, 28]. Nonethe-
less, those users that engage in these behaviors do so
relatively often [12, 21]. It may be that most users
engage in casual reading behavior (which is passive
and not observable to other users), but only those
who are very active on Facebook choose to engage in
more active behaviors that are observable to other
users. It may also be that people with certain per-
sonality traits are more or less likely to engage in
these behaviors [21]. The choice to act on a story can
be influenced by emotion or information, with liking
being driven more by emotion, commenting more by
cognition, and sharing by both [18].
Therefore, we theorize that one important factor
influencing the decision to read, like, comment on or
share social media stories is the fit with pre-existing
beliefs. The stronger the fit, the more likely the story
is to trigger an emotional reaction leading to a Like,
or to trigger a cognitive reaction leading to a com-
ment, or to both, leading to sharing. Thus:
H5: Pre-existing beliefs influence the choice to read,
like, comment on, and share a news story.
We argue that a second important factor influenc-
ing the decision to act on news stories is the extent
to which a user believes the story to be true. Believ-
ability can be an important factor in the use of social
media information [17] because if someone does not
perceive information to be true, they are less likely
to engage in it or to encourage its spread by sharing
it. Thus:
H6: The believability of a story influences the choice
to read, like, comment on, and share the story.
We argue that the primary factors affecting user
behavior are pre-existing beliefs (confirmation bias)
and the believability. It is possible that presenta-
tion format and source ratings may have additional
effects over and above confirmation bias and believ-
ability, so we include them in our analyses, although
we do not hypothesize any effects.
3. Methodology
3.1. Participants
We recruited a total of 445 participants—125
through Facebook posts by the authors and the
author’s business school, and 320 from a Qualtrics
panel. About 57% were female, and about 5% were
below 24 years of age, 40% between 25 and 44, 43%
between 45 and 64, and 13% above 65. For the edu-
cation level, approximately 37% had not completed
college, 35% had a college degree, and 28% a grad-
uate degree.
3.2. Task
The participants answered a 15-minute survey that
presented 12 news headlines, of which six were
designed to appeal to left-leaning participants and
six to right-leaning participants (see Table 1). The
headlines were formatted as they might appear
as posts on Facebook (see Figure 1). The head-
lines and images were designed to avoid major
differences in the type and magnitude of feelings
they would generate (i.e., one shocking headline
and the other bland, one with celebrity image and
the other with none, etc.). We used a gender-
neutral name for the poster—not to be confused
with the original author—and the comment from
the poster was more or less a summary of the
headline itself. All these efforts were to minimize
headline-specific effects, presentation-order effects,
and poster-specific effects.
3.3. Independent Variables
There were three treatments, and all participants
received all 12 headlines, with four headlines pre-
sented in each treatment. The headlines seen by
each participant were randomly assigned to treat-
ment and presented in random order within treat-
ment (although to prevent confusion, the treatments
were always in order from first to last).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2. An example of story format with the source highlighted (a) and with source rating (b)
Table 1. The 12 news headlines used in the experiment
- The Humane Society Foundation Donates $100,000 to
Planned Parenthood After Women’s March in DC
- A Republican GOP Senator Will Not Vote to Defund
Planned Parenthood
- Planned Parenthood Receives a Sum of $1,000,000 Dona-
tion from Crowd Sourcing
- Girl Scouts are Planning an Organization-Wide
Fundraiser for Planned Parenthood
- Planned Parenthood Visits Campuses to Educate Young
Women about the Importance of Having a Choice
- Universities Connect their Healthcare Systems with
Planned Parenthood to Provide Better Care to Coeds
- Republicans Pledge to Only Fund National Pregnancy
Care Center That Does Not Perform Abortions
- Pro-Life Supporters Rally in Front of Planned Parenthood
Nationwide
- State Republicans Introduce New Bills to Allow Abortion
Only After a Long Monitoring Period
- The State of Nevada Strengthens the Restriction on Abor-
tion and Contraception
- Planned Parenthood Now Required to Provide Classes on
Abortion Before Getting Consent for the Procedure
- On-Campus Pro-Life Supporters Significantly Reduce the
Number of Abortions among Coeds
Note: The formats of these headlines were randomized to
minimize any headline-specific effects.
The first treatment was news presentation format
(the control treatment) designed to mimic the cur-
rent Facebook style of presentation as closely as pos-
sible. The second treatment was story presentation
format with the name of the original source high-
lighted (see Figure 2(a)). The third treatment was
story presentation format with source ratings (see
Figure 2(b)). Two of the headlines were presented
with high source ratings and two with low source
ratings. A message was inserted before the third
group of headlines to elaborate on where the ratings
were hypothetically from. That way, we were able to
ensure that all subjects assumed the ratings to be
legitimate (i.e., offered by Facebook as opposed to
by some unknown third party).
Two independent variables were self-reported by
participants. The first was the affinity the partic-
ipant had for the story, which was measured by
multiplying the story’s importance to the partici-
pant (using a 7-point scale: Do you find the issue
described in the article important? 1= not at all, 7=
extremely) by the participant’s position on the story
(−3 = extremely negative to +3 extremely positive).
Thus, affinity ranged from −21 to +21.
The second was whether the participant viewed
the source as trusted or not. For non-trusted sources,
we used ClickMedium.com, NewsUnion.com, and
MediaNow.com, all of which are fabricated names
but, at the same time, sound plausible enough as
obscure news sources. We picked ABC News as the
trusted source because ABC News has been ranked
among the most trusted and well-known news out-
lets in the US across the political spectrum [6, 7].
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Nonetheless, we also asked each participant how
trusted ABC News was on a 7-point scale; 120 par-
ticipants did not regard ABC News as a trusted
source, so for them, we coded ABC News as an
untrusted source.
3.4. Dependent Variables
The believability of each story was measured by tak-
ing the average of three 7-point items (How believ-
able do you find this article, How truthful do you find
this article, How credible do you find this article).
Cronbach’s alpha was adequate (0.95).
We also measured what actions the participant
would take, specifically how likely the participant
would be to: Read, Like, Post a supporting comment,
Post an opposing comment, and Share. Each action
was assessed separately.
4. Results
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for Believability
Sample Description Mean Std. Dev. N
All Sources (Effect of story format)
News format & no rating 4.806 1.665 1655
Story format & no rating 4.692 1.739 1416
Only Obscure Sources (Effect of source rating)
Story format & no rating 4.482 1.728 905
Story format & high rating 4.980 1.636 623
Story format & low rating 4.213 1.918 615
The treatments means provide a first take on the
results (see Table 2). The average believability for
articles in the news format (i.e., no source highlight-
ing and no rating) is higher than that for articles
in the story format (without rating). For the source
rating, we exclude scores from a trusted source since
a trusted source would be more believable. Here,
the means show that a high source rating increases
believability while a low rating decreases it.
To test our hypotheses, we performed multilevel
mixed-effects linear regression using STATA. About
65% of the participants omitted one or more demo-
graphics questions, so including all the demograph-
ics items in our analyses would significantly reduce
our sample size. We did an initial analysis includ-
ing all items and found that whether or not partici-
pants were from the Qualtrics panel had significant
impacts across all dependent variables, but no other
demographics item was significant in more than one
of the seven analyses. Therefore, we retained the
Qualtrics variable but omitted other demographics
items to retain the maximum sample size. There
were no differences in the statistical conclusions with
or without the omitted demographics items. Table 3
presents the results: We present two models, Model
1 with just the direct effects and Model 2 with the
hypothesized interaction effect.
Table 3. Estimation Results for Perceived Believability
Independent
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
StoryFormat
−0.131**
(0.046)
−0.139*
(0.059)
RatedHi
0.385***
(0.070)
0.389***
(0.071)
RatedLow
−0.333***
(0.076)
−0.329***
(0.076)
Trusted
0.405***
(0.058)
0.396***
(0.076)
Trusted*
StoryFormat
0.021
(0.103)
Affinity
0.477***
(0.036)
0.477***
(0.036)
Qualtrics
0.537***
(0.095)
0.537***
(0.095)
Note: Estimated coefficients (and standard
errors). Affinity is standardized. ***p < 0.001,
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
First, this shows that Affinity has a positive and
significant effect on Believability. In other words,
we find the effect of confirmation bias in our study.
Hence, H1 is supported.
Next, StoryFormat has a negative and significant
effect on the believability of articles, supporting H2.
The format that highlights the source telling the
story makes the readers more critical about the
believability of the presented articles.
H3 argued that presentation format would moder-
ate the relationship between whether the users trust
the source and the believability of stories, so that,
when the source is highlighted in the story format,
subjects would perceive the news articles from the
trusted source more believable than those from the
untrusted ones, more so than in the news format
with no highlighted source. However, the interaction
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Table 4. Estimation Results for User Actions
Independent
Variables
Read Like Support Oppose Share
Believability
0.531***
(0.044)
0.310***
(0.034)
0.219***
(0.030)
0.090*
(0.037)
0.245***
(0.031)
StoryFormat
−0.110
(0.061)
−0.089*
(0.044)
−0.050
(0.042)
−0.156**
(0.049)
−0.116**
(0.043)
RatedHi
0.018
(0.065)
−0.090
(0.046)
−0.075
(0.045)
−0.045
(0.050)
−0.027
(0.047)
RatedLow
−0.137*
(0.062)
−0.018
(0.045)
−0.051
(0.043)
−0.027
(0.054)
−0.028
(0.045)
Trusted
0.021
(0.071)
0.008
(0.054)
0.020
(0.050)
−0.055
(0.048)
0.010
(0.048)
Trusted*
StoryFormat
0.089
(0.096)
0.058
(0.068)
0.018
(0.066)
0.157*
(0.067)
0.066
(0.067)
Affinity
0.221***
(0.035)
0.712***
(0.044)
0.515***
(0.043)
−0.314***
(0.047)
0.275***
(0.032)
Qualtrics
0.672***
(0.166)
1.338***
(0.122)
1.532***
(0.115)
1.683***
(0.137)
1.581***
(0.133)
Note:: Estimated coefficients (and standard errors). Believability and Affinity are standardized.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
term of Trusted*StoryFormat is not significant, so
H3 is not supported.
H4 argued that source ratings would affect believ-
ability. The coefficient for RatedHi is positive and
significant whereas that for RatedLow is negative
and significant, showing that rating has a significant
impact on believability. Hence, H4 is supported.
Table 4 shows the analyses for users’ actions.
Across all actions, Affinity has a significant impact;
users are more likely to read, like, and share articles
that match their point of view. Commenting activ-
ities are consistent with other types of activities;
users are more likely to leave supporting comments
for articles that match their opinion and leave oppos-
ing comments for articles that they disagree with.
In other words, confirmation bias influences users’
behaviors. Hence, H5 is supported.
Table 4 also shows that Believability has a signif-
icant positive effect on all actions, indicating that
users are more likely to act on articles they believe
to be true. Thus, H6 is supported.
The pattern of results suggests that believability
fully mediates most of the effects of story format
or source rating; that is, the story format or source
rating have few consistent effects on users’ actions
over and above their effects on believability.
5. Discussion
Our results show that presenting social media sto-
ries in a story format (with the source highlighted)
as opposed to their current news format (where
the source is suppressed) induces users to evaluate
their truthfulness more critically. Likewise, present-
ing source ratings directly influences the believabil-
ity of stories. Confirmation bias is also alive and well;
our findings show that participants were more likely
believe articles that they agreed with.
Perhaps one of the more interesting findings—or
lack thereof—was the direct effect of presentation
format on believability and the lack of an interaction
between the format and whether the user trusted
the source. We expected to find that users would
believe articles from a trusted source more when the
story format was used, but we did not find any sup-
port for the hypothesis. In other words, the story
format nudges readers to subconsciously shift their
thinking from reading facts to reading “stories” and
this simple shift in mindset induces users to be more
skeptical in evaluating the credibility of all social
media articles, regardless of whether they are from
a trusted source or not.
Our results also show that source ratings influence
the believability of stories. When the sources are
obscure, high rating boosts readers’ confidence in the
article that they see whereas low rating makes the
readers more skeptical. The coefficients in Tables 3
and 4 are standardized, so we can assess the relative
effects of presentation format versus source rating.
Source ratings have about three times the effect of
presentation format on believability (.385 and −.333
versus −.131). Interestingly, both of these have less
relative impact than affinity (i.e., confirmation bias)
(.477) or a trusted source (.405).
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Confirmation bias also affects users’ actions. Users
are more likely to read, like, post supporting com-
ments, and share articles that they agree with (and
more likely to leave opposing comments for arti-
cles they disagree with). Our results suggest that
the article’s believability could potentially counter-
balance this effect of confirmation bias.
5.1. Implications for Research
We find that source ratings from a panel of experts
hired by Facebook can have significant effects on
the believability of the article. There are, of, course
many other ways to develop source ratings. If the
ratings came from common users assessing past sto-
ries (as Amazon and eBay for past purchases), would
they have a stronger or weaker effect on believability
than ratings from a panel of experts? If the ratings
came from the users, would the mechanisms of rat-
ing matter? For instance, users can directly rate the
sources, or alternatively, they could rate the articles
that they read, and those ratings can be aggregated
at the source level. Would there be any meaningful
differences in how the users interpret these ratings
from different sources and mechanisms?
Overall, our results show that presentation format
and source rating affect the believability of stories,
which, in turn, affects users’ actions. The natural
follow up question would be, “what else affects this
believability?” This question is particularly impor-
tant because, in Table 4, Believability has an effect
on behavior comparable to Affinity. For instance, we
can infer that a change of one standard deviation in
Believability would have a similar impact as a change
of one standard deviation in Affinity on users’ shar-
ing behavior (i.e., change of 0.245 versus 0.275 on
a 7 point scale). Thus, the more we can help users
leverage their critical thinking in discerning “real”
news from “fake” news, the more effectively we can
address the problem of fake news going viral.
Table 4 shows the relative strengths of the dif-
ferent factors on the actions that users can take in
response to a news item—real or fake. For read-
ing, Believability is the most important factor, being
twice as important as the second most important fac-
tor, Affinity. For sharing, Believability has an effect
comparable to Affinity. However, the pattern is very
different for other types of behaviors such as Like,
Support, and Oppose; for these, Affinity is the dom-
inant factor, having two or three times the effect of
Believability. In other words, when clicking the like
button, or posting a supporting or opposing com-
ment, users care more about whether the story sup-
ports (or opposes) their viewpoint than whether the
story is true or false. This is curious because, in real-
ity, liking a post and commenting on it also has a
similar effect as sharing; users on Facebook can view
posts that their friends like and comment on, and
such posts appear on friends’ feeds in a similar man-
ner to shared stories. Hence, it is not clear whether
the users are aware of this indirect effect of shar-
ing through liking and commenting. Do they know
they could be spreading fake news or do they care?
If this effect was made clear to users, would it influ-
ence them to behave differently? Also, if it was made
explicit to users regarding who will see their activi-
ties, would that also make a difference?
It is also curious that demographics such as gen-
der, age, and education level had no significant
impact on believability and actions. Is this the
case in general or is it special to the online vir-
tual world? If stories were presented in the physical
world, can we expect older and more educated peo-
ple to respond more critically?
Finally, another interesting aspect is the herding
effect [36]. We focused on the original source of the
article, not the individual who shared the article on
the his or her social media feed. Would it matter
who shared the article, who liked it, and how many
people commented on it?
5.2. Implications for Practice
The public is starting to recognize the role of social
media providers and search engine providers in the
spread of fake news, and is calling for more proac-
tive measures. We approach the problem of “fake
news” from the opposite direction from many other
researchers, who have started by first building pro-
totypes and then testing if they affect trust; we start
by first testing different news formats to see how the
format affects trust and users’ actions, so we can
provide evidence-based design advice.
First, our results show that highlighting the source
and framing the news as a “story” told by the source
has an effect of making users more critical about the
believability of the posts they see. Perhaps, the most
important aspect of this finding is that we can nudge
people to be more skeptical by making a simple and
easy modification to the interface. The effects are not
as strong as other options, but the proposed change
is a low hanging fruit.
Second, our results show that the source rating
can play an important role in how people evaluate
the believability of the posts they see, which, in turn,
affects their engagement with those posts (i.e., read,
share, etc.). Implementation of a rating system will
take time and further research may be needed to
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identify the best form of source ratings. We believe
that the effect of such source ratings may go above
and beyond what we find in this study because, in
practice, many fake news are from sources that are
obscure or even deceptive. The culprits interested in
luring traffic to their sites for advertisement revenue
may post fake news as a “click bait,” and to make
their scheme more effective, they may intentionally
choose names that are very similar to legitimate ones
such as ABCnews.com.co [23, 29]. We believe source
rating can be an effective counter measure against
such deceptions.
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